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Summary 
The major purpose of this paper is to reinterpret the history of Lekhotla la Bafo (The 
Council of commoners) in terms of our knowledge of class differentiation in colonial 
Basutoland. Lekhotla la Bafo, together with the Basutoland Progressive Association 
(BPA), emerged about the time of the First World War, attacked the practice of the 
. 
abuse of power& of the chiefs, and pressed for the elected representation of commoners 
in government. In the hegemonic modernization and functionalist perspective of 
bourgeois social science in the sixties and early seventies, movements such as 
Lekhotla la Bafo were interpreted ideologically. 'The movement was seen as both 
"radical" - in its attacks on colonial rule, the missionaries, and  it^ criticisms of 
the abuses of the chieftaincy - and "conservative" - seeking the resurrection of a 
pre-Moshoeshoe concept of popular chieftaincy. The reinterpretation presented here, 
albeit tentatively, seeks to relate the struggles of the movement to the actual process 
of class differentiation in Basutoland and to the rearguard battle, against all the 
odds, for the acqpired rights of the peasantry. In doing so we have to take issue with 
certain economistic versions of the underdevelopment school which have argued that, 
since massive impoverishment and ecological decline were so endemic in the labour 
reserves of southern Africa, and that since the decisive role in the class struggle 
had shifted from the peasantariat to the urban working class, the actual progress of 
internal differentiation and class struggle can safely be ignored. While the focus of 
this paper is both tentative and historical, attempts will be made to draw out the 
relevance to current class struggles in the labour reserves. 
Underdevelopment in Basutoland 
In an earlier critique of the then hegemonic dualist interpretations of the 
'lnon-development" of Lesotho, I argued that "backwardness or non-development in 
Lesotho is not a result of a pristine traditionalism of the Basotho people but of the 
political violence waged against them at the crucial period of their economic 
development". (1) 
In brief, the "crucial period" referred to here were the years of the last 
half of the nineteenth century which brought about the incorporation of the 
f'undanentally subsistence economy of the Basotho under capitalism. This period - 
particularly after the intercession of the British in the wars between the Boer 
commandos and the Basotho and the formal establishment of the British Protectorate in 
1868 - witnessed the rise of a Basutoland peasantry geared to supply the commodity 
markets of Kimberley and, later, of the Witwatersrand. This process occurred within 
the territory of Basutoland despite the fact that, at the Convention of Aliwal North 
in 1969, the bulk of the corn-growing lands of the Basotho to the west and north of 
the Caledon river were ceded to the Free State. The conditions of peace and the 
exploitation of the diamond mines at Kimberley provided the essential conditions for 
the establishment of the peasantry in the valleys and highlands of Basutoland. 
The main structural and analytical elements of the rise and fall of the 
southern African peasantry have been admirably delineated by Bundy. (2) His 
definition of the peasantry draws heavily on the work of Saul and Woods (3) and 
draws attention to the "peasantry as process": 
A peasant society emerging during the era of the 
integration of a peripheral economy to the metropolitan 
capitalist economy is subject to rapid stmctural 
change; under the capitalist development of Africa, 
stratification within the peasantry means that some 
agriculturalists have moved out of the peasant economy 
and must be redefined, perhaps as capitalist farmers; 
other peasants have been proletarianized; in other 
words 'the further development of capitalism has begun 
to phase out the very peasantry it defined and 
created ... the existence of a peasantry could be 
viewed all the more as a transitional phenomenon. (4) 
This emphasis on peasantry as process (peasantization) is particularly important in 
the case of Basutoland, where commodity production and labour export were parallel 
and contemporaneous processes. My earlier article was specifically designed to 
counter the apologetic interpretations of Leistner and others (5) who ignored the vast 
flows of Basotho migrants in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century and 
preferred to locate the proletarianization of the Basotho peasantry in the years of 
the great depression of the nineteen thirties. In so doing such apologetics tended 
to ignore not only the process of proletarianization - about which such contem~orary 
historians as de Kiewiet (6) had been well aware but which, by the end of the century, 
was being put forward by the colonial administration in Basutoland as a positive 
defence of colonial policy: 
Though for its size and popaation Basutoland produces 
a comparatively enormous amount of grain, it has an 
industry of great importance to South Africa, viz. the 
output of native labour. It supplies the sinews of 
apiculture in the Orange Free State, to a large extent 
it keeps going railway works, coal mining, the diamond 
mines at Jagersfontein and Kimberley, the gold mines of 
the Transvaal and furnishes in addition a large 
proportion of domestic services in surrounding 
districts ... these facts are the best rejoinder to 
those who urge that Basutoland is a useless native 
reserve. To others, who urge higher education of the 
natives, it may be pointed out that to educate them 
above labour would be a great mistake. Primarily the 
native labour industry supplies a dominion want and 
secondly it tends to fertilize native territories with 
cash which is at once diffused for English goods. (7) 
The "underdevelopment" thesis has rightly focussed attention on the "non- 
economic11 forces which restricted African participation in commodity production and 
circulation. Tbese non-economic forces operated less directly in the case of 
Basutoland, where the political power of white settlers and mining interests was 
mediated by a variety of forces, particularly after 1884 when the administration of 
the Protectorate passed from the direct rule of the Cape Colony to the type of parallel 
rule discussed in detail below. But direct political intervention was clearly 
important in the process of the proletarianization of the peasantry. For example, 
successful Basotho competition for commodity maxlcets was debated in the Volksraad of 
the Orange Free State and the Transvaal and a number of measures passed to restrict 
competition from Basutoland. The annual report of the Resident Commissioner for 1887 
refers to the deleterious effects of a tariff on Basotho grain entering the Transvaal 
and estimated to cost 20,000 pounds annually, and, five years later, reports lament 
the closure of large corn markets in the Free State and Transvaal to Basutoland. 
Clearly,in the case of the labour reserves that were encapsulated directly 
within South Africa itself, direct political control over usufruct rights to land 
was the most important lever in bringing about the demise of the South African 
peasantry. Bundy's analysis of this process focusses on the cumulative effects of 
the Glen Grey Act of 1894 and the Natives Land Act of 1913 which undermined the 
position of the squatter peasant where his historical analysis closes: 
The narrative has been carried to 1913, and the 
passage of the Natives Land Act. The argument has 
been advanced that by that date African peasant areas 
showed serious signs of degeneration, and that their 
transformation into teeming rural slums - or the 
process of their underdevelopment - was well under 
way. Areas that had been able to provide for 
themselves, and in favourable seasons to export 
foodstuffs, were being reduced to a state of 
precarious self-reliance or already to a dependence 
on imported food and the remittance of wages by 
migrant labourers. (8) 
In the case of Basutoland, the problem of the exact historical location of 
the period of the demise of the peasantry is not so easy to locate. One problem here 
is that, despite massive labour export, the territory continued to be a net exporter 
of maize until the early 1930s. (9) This fact has been used to advance the thesis 
that, until this time, Basutoland was essentially "self-sufficient" instaple food- 
stuffs and that hence the argument that the Basotho were "forcedll into migrant 
labour at a much earlier date is fallacious. What this argument largely ignores is 
the prima facie evidence of growing differentiation within Basutoland and large 
disparities of income and land-holding in this period, and the perpetuation of a 
peasantry clustered around the institution of chieftainship as it was practised in 
cblonial Basutoland. 
But before elaborating this argument it is important to see how and why 
certain formations of the underdevelopment thesis tend to ignore the process of class 
differentiation. My own earlier analysis of the process of underdevelopment in 
Basutoland drew heavily on the by now classic analysis of the process of 
proletarianization of the peasantry in Southern Rhodesia by Arrighi. (10) One 
feature of Arrighl's analysis is that, once the effort price of peasant pmticipation 
in commodity markets has become so high that the process of proletari&zation'is set 
in motion, this process is largely self-perpetuating. Once the "political violence'' 
of a set of non-economic forces has severely damaged the capacity of the African 
peasantry to compete on commodity markets, then the pressure of growing population, 
the satisfaction of new "subsistence'' demands and the resulting over-grazing and 
falling yields create an automatic vicious circle of immiseration and underdevelopment. 
In brief, once the process has been set in motion it is self-perpetuating and 
increasing numbers are thrown onto the labour market regazdless of the level of real 
wages. 
One result of this form of analysis, and it is endemic in much of the 
underdevelopment school, is to ignore the actual process of class differentiation 
within the labour r6seme. In an illuminating overview of the commoditization of the 
rural economy of Zambia, Cliffe seeks to demonstrate the range of stratification that 
occurred within the rural labour reserves. In doing so Cliffe explicitly attempts to: 
l 
l 
scotch the implicitly accepted notion that because such I 
patterns of labour migration as have developed in 
Southern Africa have produced, and in fact required, a 
particularly virulent and backward form of under- 
development in the 'reservest, then any tendency 
toward differentiation among the peasantry is 
swamped by the general impoverishment. Rather we 
shall attempt to show that although the source 
areas are not primarily producing commodities 
(other than labour power) nevertheless the cash 
nexus, entering by the back door, does set in 
train a process of class formation in these areas. (11) 
Recent analyses of the process of class formation in the bantustans have emphasized 
the growth and consolidation of an African kulak peasantry and petit bourgeoisie as 
fostered by the state. (12) But specificr historical analyses of this process are thin 
on the ground. 
Class Differentiation in Colonial Basutoland 
The major argument of this paper is that under colonial rule a type of 
chieftaincy emerged, taklng on the characteristics of a petit bourgeoisie and 
consolidating a place in commodity production denied both to the emerging stratum of 
educated commoners and to the mass of commoners. By defining the chieftaincy as 
"petit bourgoeis", the role of the chiefs as agents of state power - ideologically and 
repressively - is emphasized. While the extent of the control of the chieftaincy over 
commodity production can only be indicated - in the absence of specific research - the 
political debate about the "abuses" of specific chiefs indicates the importance of 
growing class differentiation as part of the specific strategy of colonial rule. 
After the Gun Wars and the formal handover of administrative power in 
Basutolmd from the Cape Colony to Britdn, Godfrey Lagden, the British Resident 
Commissioner, enunciated the principle that "nothing should be attempted beyond the 
protection of life and property and the maintenance of law and order on the border" (13), 
and that "the Basotho were to be encouraged to establish internal self-government 
sufficient to suppress crime and settle internal disputes". According to Sheddick, 
"this system of laissez-faire fully satisfied the Basuto peoples for it was in close 
accord with the idea of trusteeship formed by Moshoeshoe in 1862". The reality was 
somewhat different. 
In practice, the British sought to consolidate a form of feudal aristocracy 
by vesting in the ruling house and the "sons of Moshoeshoe" the ideological and 
repressive functions of state power. The system had certain important characteristics: 
1. Unlike the system of "Indirect Rule" as practised in West Africa, which 
involved a fairly clear demarcation of state power as between colonial government 
and tribal authorities, the practice of colonial rule in Basutoland was to hand over 
to the chieftaincy all executive and judicial authority within the territory, e.g. all 
issues of land tenure and usufruct rights, tribal courts from which there was no 
appeal, taxation and i n t e d  police functions. 
2. The system involved active attempts by the Resident Commissioner to 
institutionalize the monopoly powers of the chieftaincy. This gave rise to the 
establishment of the House of Chiefs in 1.903 and the formation of the Basutoland 
National Council in 1910, in which the only commoners were those nominated by the 
Resident Commissioner. 
3 Unlike the loose federalism practised in the early years of the formation of 
the Basotho nation - under conditions of fairly constant guerrilla war - in which the 
power, authority, wealth and position of individual chiefs fluctuated according to the 
conditions of struggle and was held in check by fluid national boundaries and the 
institution of the pitsa, the institutionalization of the chieftaincy undermined its 
popular basis. Ashton, who was well aware of the role of the chieftaincy in the 
process of differentiation, commented: 
Formerly the chiefs, whose position was largely 
dependent on popular support, spent their surplus 
on feeding their people, helping needy but 
influential persons, and providing the poor with 
gifts, loaned stock (mafisa) and even, in a few 
cases, with wives. Now that political power is 
largely independent of popularity, there is no 
need for them to do this and they and other wealthy 
people can, if they wish, expend their wealth on 
advanced education for their children and luxuries 
for themselves such as expensive tailor-made suits, 
large houses built on hopean lines, motor cars, 
travel, liquor and race horses, (15) 
4. In theory, the system of chieftaincy involved the establishment of District, 
Sub-District Chiefs and Ward headmen in an hierarchical system. In practice, the 
practice of "placement" meant that relatives of the paramount Chief could be placed 
in authority over Sub-Chiefs and Ward headmen. This entailed an enormous 
proliferation of chieftainship leading Pim to quote as fair comment the remark of a 
speaker in the National Council that "there are now as many chiefs in Basutoland as 
there are stars in the heaven". (16) 
5 The specific measures used by the chiefs to ensure their dominant place in 
commodity production can only be outlined here. The most important were the system 
of tribute, the distribution of land and, to some extent,stock, and court fines. The 
most important system of tribute was labour tribute on the fields of the chief, the 
tsimo ea lira. Originally the system of lira - collective work on the lands of the 
chief - was confined to the lands of the Paramount Chief but there is evidence that 
District and Sub-Chiefs increasingly acquired lira and that, by the nineteen 
thirties, cash payments and fines were increasingly replacing labour tribute, letsema. 
Control of the distribution of usufruct rights to land, the share-crop system and 
the practice of mafisa by which stock were loaned out to commoners in a system of 
disguised wage labour, all served to enhance the capacity of chiefs to engage in 
commodity production at the expense of commoners. Ashton remarks specifically on the 
practice of "eating up a person", i.e. dispossession of wealthy commoners: 
They obstinately opposed economic development that 
might enrich and emancipate their subjects, and were 
given, even then, to the practice of feating up a 
person': namely, punishing a prosperous man for some 
misdemeanour by seizing all or the greater part of his 
stock. (17) 
Little is known, even today, of the actual extent of class differentiation 
in the territory. Figures put forward by the present regime to indicate a remarkably 
egalitarian distribution of wealth are clearly fraudulent. (18) The preoccupation of 
colonial authorities with the system of administrative control led contemporary 
observers such as Ashton, Sir Alan Pim and Hailey laxgely to ignore the extent of 
inequality, and totally to ignore the struggles of Lekhotla la Bafo against their 
increasing marginalization. At the instigation of the Pim Commission a survey was 
carried out in the District of Qachals Nek in 1934. The survey found that 80 per 
cent of taxpayers of less than five years1 standing, 32 per cent of those of between 
five and ten years' and 17 per cent of those of over ten yearsf standing were 
recorded as having no stock. On this same sample, 84,. 30 and 9 per cent, respectively, 
were recorded as-having no stock. A ti* sample carried out in the Highlands in 1936 
showed that c. 11 per cent had more than twenty head of cattle and 50 small stock and 
that 30 per cent had little or no stock. (19) 
But, measured in terms of consumption patterns, contemporary observers were 
quite clear oh the extent of inequality. They distinguished between a "wealthier" 
class, principally of chiefs with extensive holdings of land and stock and with 
conspicuous consumption patterns, a "middle" class of village headmen and commoners 
who could feed and clothe themselves on imported commodities, possess land, stock and 
farm implements and educate their children, and a "poor" class without stock who, 
even in non-drought years, could neither feed, clothe nor house themselves and their 
families adequately. 
The position of the proletarianiaed commoners who, by before the end of the 
nineteenth century, had become the "sinews" of the labour force in mining, agriculture 
and public works in the Free State and the Transvaal is most manifest. Less clear is 
that of what contemporary observers referred to as the 'lmiddle class" of educated 
commoners. The absence of opportunities to engage in large-scale trading, confined 
by the colonial government to whi.tes and, in the northern districts, a few Asians, 
prevented the consolidation of this class and led it, as we shall see, to adopt 
collaborationist positions in internal politics. The position of the wealthier chiefs 
in commodity production was disguised by a variety of factors - pot least the practice 
of mafisa. What contemporary observers could see of the wealth of district and sub- 
district chiefs clearly impressed them: 
In 1934, one chief, who kindly showed me his books, 
owned 200 cattle, 1,500 small stock, 90 equines, and 
31 large lands, which in a fair year yielded 300 bags 
of grain; he had also a revenue from his court of 
about 200 cattle, 225 small stock and 20 pounds cash, 
and an allowance of 100 pounds (subsequently raised to 
300 pounds) from the administration. He was one of 
the wealthier chiefs, but not as wealthy as the late 
Chief Jonathan, who died leaving an estate worth over 
20,000 pounds. (20) 
Political Protest and the League of the Common Man 
Of modem political organizations in Basutoland, the Basutoland Progressive 
Association (BPA) founded in 1904 was most closely associated with the new "middle 
class" of educated commoners. Its core was composed of teachers, clerical workers 
and traders who had been educated at the missions of the Paris Evangelical Mission 
Society (PENS) which had dominated missionary education in the nineteenth century. 
Their key political objectives were greater elected representation in decision-making - 
specifically the inclusion of an elected element in the National Council - and to 
press via the colonial administration for the abolitian of specific abuses of the 
powers of the chiefs. The zenith of the BPA was reached in the late thirties with an 
estimated membership of 3-5,000. In political terms, the BPA stood half-way between 
the more progressive elements within the chieftaincy and the colonial administration 
itself. As the colonial administration, for its own purposes, sought to curb the 
power of the chiefs in the forties, so the influence of the BPA declined. By the 
early thirties the; system of parallel rule (laissez-faire) was, from the British 
viewpoint, clearly breaking down. This viewpoint was primarily concerned with the 
economic cost of the administration of the territory and the issue - outside the terms 
of reference of this paper - of incorporation of the territory into the Union of South 
Africa. By the ewly thirties, the long-term underdevelopment of the labous: reserve, 
together with drought and the crisis of the world market, had produced for the first 
time a deficit in government accounts. One result of this was to convince the colonial 
administration of the necessity of more direct state intervention in the territory. 
One result of this line of thinking was the Pim Commission which advocated the 
abolition of parallel rule and the official gazetting of chiefs who became in effect, 
when these reforms were implemented during and after World War 11, a salaried civil 
service. With these reforms - which included a drastic reduction in the numbers and 
powers of the chiefs - the BPA was largely satisfied and their influence dwindled. 
Lekhotla la Bafo (l1 the council of commcmers" , hereafter referred to as the 
"~eague") was far more closely involved with the commoners (chiefs and their families 
were explicitly excluded from membership) and specifically wLth that strata of 
commoners who had experienced the boom in commodity production of the 1870s. The 
League, with a very loose organizational structure, is closely associated with the 
character of its founder, Josiel Lefela, whose history reveals much of the class 
character of the movement. 
Josiel Lefela was born in Mapoteng, a village in the Berea district, in 
1885, the third son of Nolebo, a commoner. After mission school with the PENS, 
Lefela went off to the mines in Johannesburg. According to one account, he hated 
the thought of going underground and absconded after his very first shift. He seems 
to have spent some years in Johannesburg, where he developed a considerable range of 
contacts - including, according to one account, Kadalie of ICU fame - and devoted 
much of his time to his own education, particularly on the history of South Africa 
and Basutoland (he is said to have been able to quote Thealfs Basutoland Records at 
length). By 1910 he had returned home, married the first of three wives, and built 
up a small business, including a bar and a butcher's shop. (21) 
The League, which was constituted shortly before the First World War, had 
as its prime aim to attack not only specific abuses of the chieftaincy but the 
institutionalization of the chieftaincy under colonial administration, described 
above. This objective is most clearly formulated in the preamble to constitution to 
the League, which begins: 
Whereas the late Chief Moshesh and his successors in 
office did not satisfy the people in their government 
by the establishment and sustenance of a national 
assembly known as a 'Pitsof and held at Thuto-Ea-Moli. 
And whereas the said Pitso was in the year 1903 
abolished and the present Basutoland National Council 
constituted composed of the chiefs and their advisors. 
And whereas the present composition of the National 
Council is not in the best interests of good government 
of the territory by reason of the exclusion from 
membership of persons and associations other than the 
chiefs and their advisers. It is resolved: (a) to 
form an association to safeguard, promote and protect 
the best interests and welfare of its members and 
persons other than the chiefs and their advisers . . . (22) 
A key feature in this issue was the absence, under the institutionalised chieftaincy, 
of any forum for the redress of the grievances of commoners. Lefela himself was, 
periodically, a nominated member of the National Council and used this forum regularly 
to emphasize that the Council regularly refused to consider commonersf petitions. The 
Paramount Chief, Griffith, sought to place the burden of these demands on the colonial 
administration by seeking the advice of the Resident Commissioner, Edward Garrawa;~, 
who replied: 
I say if such matters do not interest members of the 
Council and they do not find favour with you, these 
people can do nothing and even if they succeed in 
obtaining the sympathy of a member, I still have the 
right . . . to refuse a discussion in the Council (23), 
and, in a later comment, advised Griffith to "just acknowledge receipt without comment 
excepting to say they should mind their own business". (24) 
One feature of the League which distinguished it from the BPA was its 
recurrent attacks on the Mission churches, not only on the Catholic Church, which 
underwent great expansion during Griffithls reign and under his sponsorship, but also 
on the PENS. The League was closely associated with the independent church movement, 
and specifically with the church movement that broke away from the PENS and established 
the "Church of Moshoeshoe" (~ereka Ea ~oshoeshoe) in 1922. 
But the key feature of the League which distinguished it from the BPA was 
its refusal to ally itself with a reformist administration against the chieftaincy as 
such. To contemporary llmodernisers"., such refusal indicated the innate conservatism 
of the League on the issue of chieftaincy reform. But what is clear from the writings 
of the League is that they regarded the whole question of chieftaincy as a matter to 
be considered, struggled and fought for within an African context: an issue which was 
not to be settled by the proclamation of colonial "authority", an authority which they 
did not recognize. Thus, fundamental to an understanding of the League is their 
rejection of colonial authorityper se. Lefela himself saw this in a much wider 
context than the territory of Basutoland. His attacks on colonialism were considered 
too radical by most of the leadership of the African National Congress and, in 1928, 
he was denied access to the ANC journal, Abantu Batho. Lefela then began to publish 
articles in the South African Worker and, on behalf of the League, invLted Gumede to 
address meetings in Basutolaud. This was prevented only by strong-arm tactics 
engineered by the chiefs. (25) Indeed the whole position of the League on the issue 
of colonialism was well to the left of the ANC. One manifestation of this was the 
issue of military recruitment during World War 11. While the ANC demanded the right 
of African volunteers to bear m s  but supported the war effort, the League publicly 
urged the Basotho not to serve. For their efforts, the leadership of the League were 
detained during the war. 
One characteristic of the League, on which I have speculated, is the 
absence of sustained struggle on a whole variety of issues which affected Basotho 
commoners as part of the southern African working class. Despite the involvement of 
the League on the issue of incorporation, issues that affected commoners as migrant 
workers - recruitment, taxation, accidents and mortality, etc. - figure far less 
prominently in the available records. When, in the mid-fifties, Lefela virtually 
disbanded the League and, at a public meeting of the Basuto Congress Party at Thaba 
Bosiu on Moshoeshoe Day in 1957, gave his public blessing to Ntsu Mokhehle (himself 
a former member of the ~eague), declaing that the BCP was "the son of I&khotla la 
Bafo", the League was merged in a mass organization which, until a major split 
occurred in 1958, regarded itself as the organization of the ANC within the 
territory. By contrast to the BCP, the League defined both the arena of political 
struggle and the issues it raised in terms of the territory. 
------ooo----- 
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